(Lecture given at the Conference on
"EU-Gesetze und Naturheilverfahren" on 15 Nov. 1996, organized by the Zentrum zur Ookumentation van fur Naturlieilverfahren e.V.)
Dr. Paul Lannoye's report to the European Parliament(1) is Europe's most
widely discussed political paper about Complementary Medicine. It's
general statement is: medical pluralism has to be established throughout the
European Community.
Medical pluralism means that medicine is not a monolithic block but
consists of different directions(2) - e.g. phytotherapy, homeopathy and
anthroposophical medicine - and these directions of therapy need to be
judged and evaluated according to their own criteria.
This medical pluralism is being opposed by many representatives of
orthodox medicine. They believe that there is a declining quality in the
spectrum of judging the efficacy of treatment. One extreme in this spectrum
is me everyday clinical judgment of the physician is deemed unreliable. The
other extreme is the randomized double-blind trial being questioned as the
only proof of efficacy. For example, a member of the German Medizinischer
Dienst writes: "The question whether a remedy is efficacious or not can never
be solved with single cases... Controlled double-blind trials with large
groups of patients and long periods of observation are indispensable."(3) This
attitude - that everyday clinical judgment of the physician is unreliable and
valid judgment of efficacy is possible only in controlled clinical trials - is
methodological monism.
Wherever methodological monism becomes the basis of drug regulation,
can be eliminated because most of the remedies of have not been subjected to
controlled trials. There are many reasons for this: Complementary Medicine
mainly is done by practitioners; Complementary Medicine has been excluded
from academic institutions; in Complementary Medicine, patients and
doctors are highly skeptical against controlled clinical trials. Therefore, when
Methodological Monism is introduced as the general, obligatory standard in
the European Community, no medical pluralism can be established. There
are contradictory positions: Methodological Monism stands against Medical
Pluralism. For the future perspectives of medical pluralism, the decisive
question is whether methodological monism is justified or not. The following
outlines reasons for a double position.
Methodological monism is not justified - Medical pluralism is legitimate
Central argument - the Placebo Effect
Fifty years ago in the history of medicine, clinical judgment of physicians lost
its credibility and controlled clinical trial gained overwhelming dominance.
The first conference on placebos was the Cornell Conference on The Use of
Placebos in 1946. This conference was opened by E. F. DuBois saying: "As a
matter of fact, I think we can show that the study of the placebo is the most
important step to be taken in scientific therapy."(4)
It is interesting to read the protocol of that conference and learn why the
participants were convinced that placebos could be therapeutically effective.
The protocol says: "The enormous success of homeopathy, where drugs are
given in great dilution (in sugar pills) so dilute that they could not possibly
have any pharmacologic action, is a good example. Its success and therapeutic
results are probably better than those in the case of some of the regular
drugs that are given in huge doses by the rival practitioners. At least, it has
demonstrated very clearly what can be done by placebos."(5) Then, the participants reported what kind of efficacy placebos can have, e.g. against sleeping
problems or gastric problems. After this, different placebos were named, e.g.
Gentiana or Valeriana. These are phytotherapeutic remedies with specific
effects against the ailments mentioned.
One needs to see what happened at this conference. The placebo discussion
had been initiated in 1946 because orthodox medical doctors observed
therapeutic successes of homeopathy and phytotherapy and because
these successes did not fit into their theoretical framework about reality and
medicine. They were not open to accepting that it had specific therapy effects.
They were looking for a pseudo-rationalization of these therapy successes,
and they invented the argument of the "placebo effect", using a word that
has been around for a long time. This is an historical fact and can be read in
the protocol of that conference.
In 1955, Henry K. Beecher published a paper. The Powerful Placebo.(6) This
work has been seminal; it became world famous. It has been responsible, as
Robert says,(7) for the double-blind trial becoming the universal standard of
therapy judgment. In this publication, Beecher quantified the placebo effect:
on the basis of 15 clinical trials including 1082 patients, he summarized that
35% of patients with a variety of different diseases could be satisfactorily
treated by placebos alone with "true therapeutic effects." Thus, the existence
of the placebo effect has been scientifically established.
Of course, the consequences for the clinical judgment of the physician
have been fatal. When a large percentage of patients can be successfully
treated with placebos alone, the physician cannot know whether a particular
therapy success comes along due to his specific therapeutic measures or
whether it only reflects a placebo. In short, with the placebo argument being
true, the physician cannot judge the specific efficacy of his therapies. Thus,
there cannot be valid clinical judgment.
Beecher's The Powerful Placebo justified breaking with traditional "experiential" medicine, ignoring clinical judgment and clinical experience, and
installing the double-blind clinical trial as a decision instrument for drug
regulation. In fact, researchers from Beecher's group have influenced the
legislation of the United States to replace the physician's experience by controlled
clinical trials for matters of drug registration, beginning with the
Kevauer Bill of 1962.(8)
In 1995, a book was published by Gunver Sophia Kienie, The So-Called
Placebo Effect: Illusion, Facts, Reality (original: Der sogenannte Placeboeffekt:
Illusion, Fakten, Realitdt),(9) in which the complete original literature of
Beecher's publication has been reanalyzed with a surprising result: in none of
the 15 trials Beecher had referred to was there the slightest reason to suppose
any placebo effect. There are many factors which can imitate placebo effects:
natural history of the disease, regression to the mean, concomitant treatments,
obliging reports, experimental subordination, severe methodological
defects in the studies, misquotes, etc. However, with great plausibility there
was no placebo effect analyzed in 800 papers. All this literature gave the
same picture: nowhere has the existence of any therapeutic placebo effect
been convincingly demonstrated.(10)
These investigations have been published only recently; but they have
aroused resonance and recognition. After an article was published in June,
1996 in Forschende Kompletdrmedizin,(11) four other medical journals
spontaneously wished to reprint this article. Even representatives of the
German Society of Medical Documentation and Statistics expressed respect.
At the 1996 Congress of the German Society for Gynecology and Obstetrics
(Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Gynakologie und Geburtsheilkunde) Gunver
Kienle's recent placebo publications have been honored with the Hevert
award because of their "eminent importance for the whole of medicine." This
issue will soon be discussed at a placebo conference at the National Institute
of Health in Washington.
The placebo argument has lost its scientific value. This is important for
medicine because the clinical judgment of the physician regains autonomy,
and this must have consequences on drug regulation.
The physician's judgment of efficacy
Most remedies of Complementary Medicine have been available for decades.
To no demand controlled clinical trials for regulatory purposes implies that
physicians are not able to judge whether their therapeutic measures help or
do not help. With this insinuation, the physician could be forced to accede to
a posteriori-controlled trials, which would mean the best therapist is the
physician who subordinates to the results of controlled clinical trials without
making sure his treatments do or do not help his patient (it being assumed
that the only valid and reliable judgment of efficacy is possible through
controlled trials and not through his judgment). Considering the absurdity of
this, one need only think of the many treatments that have a dosage
calibration according to the patient's reactions: insulin therapy in diabetes,
treatment of hypertension, pain therapy, psychiatric therapies and many
more. These therapies could not be handled without the physician judging
the effects of his treatment.
When discussing the judgment of efficacy, a central problem is the exclu-
sive orientation toward medical statistics. The professionalism of medical
statistics blocks the awareness of other forms of efficacy judgment which are
not statistical, which can be applied to single cases, and which are not less valid
than so-called controlled clinical trials. Medical statistics are a powerful source
of dogmatism. One is dealing with an example of what, in The Lancet, has been
called the "extra-ordinary capacity of the profession for self-delusion."(12)
Up to now, the exclusive statistical orientation has prevented investigation
of the structures of the individual physician's judgment as well as the
methods of non-statistical judgment of therapy. Valid, non-statistical methods
of efficacy judgment exist in single patients.(13) It is these methods that
have been used by practitioners (without methodological reflection) for ages.
Why controlled clinical trials cannot be decisive criteria for drug regulation
Double-blind clinical trials tend to produce false-negative results
Blinding of clinical trials should prevent false-positive results. However, for
several years we have known that blinding itself can produce the opposite:
false-negative results.(14) It has been believed that randomization and blinding
neutralize all possible influences upon observation and reporting of effects,
but this is not true. In fact, when blinding a trial, several factors have the
tendency to be stronger in the group of lesser-treated patients, thus possibly
concealing the efficacy of the test drug. Of course, when a test method is
fallible in itself (with a one-sided tendency to false-negative results) it should
not be declared an obligatory instrument of efficacy judgment.
In Complementary Medicine controlled clinical trials are not practicable in most cases
In most cases, there are many reasons why controlled clinical trials cannot be
done in Complementary Medicine.(15) For example, blinding often is impossible
because of technical reasons, e.g. with mistletoe injections, with etheric
oils, amaroids, teas, etc. Strictly demanding double-blind trials for the registration
of these substances would exclude them from medical usage regardless
of their benefit. Blinding is impossible in neural therapy since a double-
blind trial cannot be done without bodily injury. Even without blinding,
other problems remain: long-term clinical trials for chronic disease would be
impossible. Hawley and Wolfe showed(16) that out of 122 studies for long-term
therapy in polyarthritis, only 57 had been controlled; and out of these, only 2
studies went longer than one year, and none went longer than two years.
There is not sufficient compliance from the patients for long-term studies -
they drop out of the trials - so for merely technical reasons there is no chance
for "proofs" of efficacy for Complementary Medicine in chronic diseases.
Moreover, Complementary Medicine is primarily used by practitioners who
do not have the infrastructure necessary for clinical trials. In Complementary
Medicine, both patients and physicians are resentful of controlled trials.
Official demands/or controlled trials in Complementary Medicine are unethical in
most cases
The ethical basis for clinical research is the declaration of the World
Health Organization in Geneva, Helsinki and Tokyo: "Concern for the interest
of the subject must always prevail over the interests of science and
society."(17) Therefore, a randomized trial needs equal chances. At the beginning
of a trial, there should not be any reason to assume that one treatment
will be superior to the other; otherwise the trial would not be ethical.
However, meta-analyses show that these equal chances probably do not
really exist. For example, from the data of a meta-analysis by Dickersin et al.(18)
of about 945 published and non-published trials (it was corrected against
publication bias), one can conclude: there were better results in the verum
group in 65.3% (47.5% with p<0.05); but for the control group, only in 8.9%
(3.8% with p<0.05). Similar results are shown through the data of a metaanalysis
by Juhl et al.(19) There was a verum group superiority in 61%
compared to a control group superiority in 1.6%. These results generally
indicate that patients in control groups are disadvantaged. (For a complete
survey on ethical problems of randomized controlled trials, see(20).)
This ethical problem primarily affects affects remedies of Complementary
Medicine that have been used by physicians for decades and applied because
physicians have had therapeutic successes and have been
convinced of their efficacy. In this case, authorities cannot afterward demand
controlled trials as a prerequisite for registration. According to German
constitutional judge (Verfassungsrichter), Gerhard Leibholz, it is illegitimate
to demand controlled trials for Complementary Medicine: "Ein vom Hersteller
zu erbringender Nachweis der Wirksamkeit des Arzneimittels ist jedenfalls fur die
'Naturheilmittel' verfassungswidrig."(21)
Summary
To establish Medical Pluralism in Europe political instruments will not
suffice. Politics will need assistance from science, in particular from
methodology. It will be necessary to overcome Methodological Monism. A
double strategy is necessary: (1) one needs to show that the general demand
for controlled clinical trials is not justified, and (2) one has to substantiate the
overall reliability of the clinical judgment of the clinician.
It may also be appropriate to have a three-part coalition: (1) the people's
interest in unconventional Complementary Medicine; (2) unconventional,
innovative politicians; and (3) unconventional, innovative scientists.
Helmut Kiene, MD
Institut fur angewandte Erkenntnistheorie und medizinische Methodologie
Muselgasse 10
D-79112 Freiburg i. Brst.
Germany
References & Bibliography
1. Lannoye, P. Europaisches Parlament. Ausschuss fur Umweltfragen, Volksgeundheit
und Verbraucherschutz. Entwurf eines Berichts zm Status der Alternativmedizin. 3 March 1994. Doc-DE\Pr\245773.
2. Zentrum zur Dikumatatnion fiir Naturheilverfahren e.V.: Dokumentation der besonderen Therapierichtungen und natiirlichen Heilweisen in Europa. Band I-V. Im Auftrag des Niedersachsischen Mmisteriums fur Wirtschaft, Technologie und Verkehr. VGM-Verlag Luneburg1991.
3. Wolk, Wofgang. Paramedizinische Therapie und Rechtsprechung. MedR 1995.12:492-496.
4. Conferences on Therapy: The Use of Placebos in Therapy. NY State { A/led. Aug. 1946: 1718-1727
5. Ibid.
6. Beecher, H.K. The Powerful Placebo. Journal of Anthroposophic Medicine 1995.159:1602-1606.
7. Roberts, H.A., Kewman, D.G., Mercier, L., Hovell, M. The Power of Nonspecific Effects in Healing: Implications for Psychosocial and Biological Treatments. Clinical Psychology Reviews 1993.13:375-391.
8. Temin, P. Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulations in the United States. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. and London, England. 1980.
9. Kienie, G.S. Der sogenannte Placeboeffekt: Illusion, Fakten, Realitat. Schattauer Verlag Stuttgart 1995.
10. Kienie, G.S., Kiene, H. Placeboeffekt und Placebokonzept - eine kritische methodologische und konzeptionelle Analyse von Angaben zum Ausmafi des Placeboeffekts. Forsch Komplemenfdrmed, 19963:121-138.
11. Ibid.
12. Editorial: Breast Cancer: have we lost our way? The lancet 199 (Feb. 6); 341:343-344.
13. Kiene, H., Schon-Angerer, T. Single Case Causality Assessment as a Basis of Clinical Judgment Alternative Therapies in Medicine and Health, 1996. In press.
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Arzneimittein in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Aurelia Verlag Baden-Baden 1995.
16. Hawley, D., Wolfe, F. Are the Results of Controlled Clinical Trials and Observational Studies of Second Line Therapy in Rheumatoid Arthritis valid and Generalizable as Measures of Rheumatoid Arthritis Outcome:Analysis of 122 Studies. Journal of Rheumatology; 1991; 18: 1008-1014.
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19. Juhl, E., Christensen, E., Typstrup, N. The Epidemiology of Gastrointestinal Randomized Trials. New England Journal of Medicine, 1977; 296:20-22.
20. Kiene, H. Kornplementarmedizin-Schulmedizin: der Wissenschaftssreit am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Schattauer Verlag Stuttgart, 2 August 1996.
21. Leibholz, G. Arzmeittelsicherheit und Grundgesetz. Rechtsgutachten. 50 Seiten. Zu beziehen durch die Arztliche Aktionsgemeinschaft fur Therapiefreiheit e.V. Pforzheim.
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Kirsch, I., Weixel, L.J. Double-blind versus Deceptive Administration of a Placebo. Behavioral Neuroscience, 1988; 102(2): 319-323.
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